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If the inhabitants of democratic countries had neither the right nor
the taste for uniting for political objects, their independence would
run great risks, but they could keep to their wealth and their knowl-
edge for a long time. But, if they did not learn some habits of acting
together in the affairs of daily life, civilization itself would be in
peril.'
In democratic countries knowledge of how to combine is the mother
of all other forms of knowledge; on its progress depends that of all
the others .... If men are to remain civilized or to become civilized,
the art of association must develop and improve among them.2
INTRODUCTION
Humans can ignore anything, G.K. Chesterton observed, as long
as the thing being ignored is big enough. The contemporary discus-
sion swirling about the issue of labor law reform well illustrates the
curious truth of Chesterton's remark. Despite the intensity with
which this debate has been conducted and the air of scientific objectiv-
ity and certainty that frequently permeates it, we have managed to
overlook some pretty big things. For example, we completely have
failed to appreciate the fact that the better than thirty-year long de-
cline of unions is not an isolated occurrence. Instead, it is part of a
much broader and deeply troubling trend that has affected every sort
of mediating group in our society. Our blinkered insistence on treat-
ing the deterioration of autonomous employee associations as a soli-
tary phenomenon has precluded us from comprehending either the
complexity of its causes or the full extent of its implications. We simi-
larly are inclined to look past the significance of collective bargaining
as a social institution as well as the conditions necessary to stable and
ongoing cooperation, whether in the workplace or anywhere else.
* Associate Professor of Law, Boston College Law School. This Article reflects research
on a larger study in which the author is engaged. He gratefully acknowledges the aid of the
Fund for Labor Relations Studies and the generous support of Lynde and Harry Bradley Foun-
dation in pursuit of this work.
1. ALEXIS DE TOCOUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 514 (J.P. Meyer ed. & George
Lawrence trans., Anchor Books 1969) (1850).
2. Id. at 517.
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The unifying theme in all this is our pronounced tendency to
overlook the importance of the middle. By middle, I mean families,
religious congregations, service and fraternal groups, grassroots polit-
ical clubs, unions and like institutions that mediate the relation be-
tween individuals and the large institutions of market and state that
characterize so much of public life today.3 The healthy functioning of
these mediating bodies-which Edmund Burke described as the "little
platoons ' 4 of society-is of crucial concern. For it is through these
bodies that we literally learn and practice the habits necessary for self-
rule at both the individual and social level. This fact explains why
Tocqueville placed such stress on the importance of associations and
mediating groups and their potential to act as "schools for democ-
racy. ' '5 As he so clearly understood, individuals and societies alike
become self-governing only by repeatedly and regularly engaging in
acts of self-government. It is the habit that sustains the condition.
Succinctly stated, we cannot learn toleration and respect for
others in a vacuum. Nor can we learn or practice self-rule in isolation.
As humans, we are not self-sufficient beings. We only learn who we
are, and gain some sense of the fullness of our human character,
through dealing with others. Hence, it is the small associations and
mediating bodies, where society is realized, that act as the seedbeds
for the civic virtues. For it is in them that we learn the habits neces-
sary to sustain democratic political life. To leave these seedbeds un-
tended is to put the entire project of self-rule at grave risk. Our
tendency to overlook the middle grows out of our curious propensity
to ignore the biggest thing of all: what we are as human beings and
the intrinsically social character of our personhood. By so doing, we
sell ourselves short and trade over our full status for a pot of message.
While we-and, more importantly, those who come after us-are
bound by such exchanges, we cannot help ultimately but to be both
disappointed and injured by them.6
One of the most complicated parts of all of this arises from the
fact that the well-being of these various mediating bodies is deeply
interdependent. Their existence is mutually conditioning, and the
3. For a concise discussion of the functions of mediating institutions in modem society, see
PETER L. BERGER & RICHARD JOHN NEUHAUS, To EMPOWER PEOPLE: THE ROLE OF MEDIAT-
ING STRUCTURES IN PUBLIC POLICY (1977).
4. EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 53 (Thomas Mahoney
ed. 1955).
5. See TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 1, at 63.
6. On this matter, see Thomas C. Kohler, Individualism and Communitarianism at Work,
1993 B.Y.U. L. REv. 727.
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health of any one of them has an impact on the rest. In short, there is
more involved and more at stake in labor law reform than we may
think. What follows is a brief outline of a few of the things I believe
are too big to ignore in considering the shape labor law reform may
take.
I. DOES THE EMPLOYMENT ORDER MATITER? DOES IT MATTER
IN THE WAY WE TYPICALLY THINK IT DOES?
Just as we have sold the character of our personhood short, so do
we tend to understate the significance of the order that shapes the
employment relationship. 7 It is tempting to ascribe this restraint to
modesty, but that is one characteristic for which lawyers and academ-
ics generally are not well-known. Rather, we tend to understate the
function and importance of this order because we understate or mis-
construe the character of our personhood. There may be a further
reason as well. Perhaps none of us really want to own-up to the re-
sponsibility that comes with suggesting and promoting a framework of
norms by which peoples' lives should be conducted.
As Aristotle, Montesquieu, and Tocqueville (among others) are
at pains to point out, people's habits are of more significance than
their law. Yet, as they also make clear, law performs a pedagogical
function. It thereby plays a direct role in shaping and developing the
habits that undergird the legal order. In short, the law and the culture
stand in a reflexive, mutually conditioning relationship. To under-
stand the meaning of either, or their long-term effects and direction,
one must take account of both.
The big problem with taking labor and employment law as seri-
ously as we ought is that it is basically, well, a bit scruffy. Like family
law (from which it developed),8 labor law deals with messy things like
personal relationships and seemingly mundane day-to-day issues. It
lacks the cool hauteur of constitutional law and the sort of cachet that
attaches to model building and theory spinning. Consequently, it is
relatively easy to assign the law governing employment a low status in
the legal hierarchy.
7. Throughout this portion of the Article, I have used the terms order, law, labor law, and
employment law interchangeably. The terms labor law and employment law frequently imply
different ordering regimes. Cf Hugh Collins, Labour Law as a Vocation, 105 LAW Q. REv. 468
(1989). But, I mean here to talk about order in its broadest sense, including formal and informal
sets of rules. On the topic of the workplace order and its relation to the social order generally,
see the classic work by JoiHN T. DUNLOP, INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS SYSTEMS (rev. ed., 1993).
8. See MARY ANN GLENDON, THE NEW FAMILY AND THE NEW PROPERTY 143-51 (1981).
19931
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Nevertheless, it is precisely its impact on the daily, the concrete,
the particular, that marks the real significance of the law governing
work. People are self-constituting beings. We make ourselves to be
what we are through the activities in which we habitually are engaged.
Consequently, it is the seemingly insignificant routines and actions of
everyday life that make all the difference. For it is through them that
we literally are forming ourselves as individuals and as a society.
As David Feller pointed out twenty years ago,9 the law governing
the work relationship touches employees more directly and frequently
than virtually any other aspect of the public ordering regime. That
statement remains true. But it is now true of far more people, and of
a far greater proportion of our populace. Indeed, the overall increase
in labor force participation is one of the most striking social develop-
ments of the past forty years.
A few statistics help to illustrate the point. Currently, about
ninety-three percent of adult males are in the labor force-a figure
that has remained roughly steady for some decades. 10 Since 1950,
however, women's participation in the workforce has climbed by more
than two hundred percent." Presently, seventy-four percent of wo-
men aged twenty-five to fifty-four are employed,12 the overwhelming
proportion of them full-time.' 3 Not surprisingly, working hours for
women have been increasing steadily over the past twenty years.14
Additionally, one recently published major study shows that after
9. David E. Feller, A General Theory of the Collective Bargaining Agreement, 61 CAL. L.
REV. 663, 761 (1973).
10. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BULL. No. 2385, WORKING WO-
MEN: A CHARTBOOK 48 (1991) (labor force participation for persons 25-54 years of age). Actual
participation rates for men have declined slowly but steadily over the past three decades. In
1962, 96.8% of adult men were in the workforce. Id. For one brief consideration of the decline
among men in the workforce participation, see Howard V. Hayghe & Steven H. Haugen, A
Profile of Husbands in Today's Labor Market, MONTHLY LAB. REv., Oct. 1987, at 12.
11. Dana Priest, Major Changes Seen in Female Labor Force; in 1990, 60% of Mothers With
Young Went to Work, WASH. POST, March 25, 1992, at A21. See also WORKING WOMEN: A
CHARTBOOK, supra note 10, at 48.
12. WORKING WOMEN: A CHARTBOOK, supra note 10, at 48. In 1990, of 9 industrialized
nations (the United States, Australia, Canada, France, Italy, Japan, The Netherlands, Sweden,
and the United Kingdom), only Sweden and Canada had greater female workforce participation
than the United States. Since 1970, the participation gap between Sweden and the United States
narrowed, while the rate for Canadian women grew rapidly and now narrowly surpasses the U.S.
rate. Significant increases in workforce participation by women since 1970 also occurred in the
United States, Australia, and The Netherlands. Italy's rate of 30% was the smallest portion of
the nations for which data was available. Id. at 9-10.
13. Id. at 13. The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) figures show that 77% of employed
adult women worked 35 or more hours weekly. Among unemployed women, 80% were seeking
full-time work. Also see figures in Table A-16, at 48.
14. Thus, between 1970 and 1989, the proportion of women working on a full-time, year
round basis grew from 41 to 51%. BUREAU OF LABOR STATsTIcS, supra note 10, at 13.
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years of gradual decline, the normal work week for Americans has
increased to the point where the average employee now works the
equivalent of an additional month more than was worked in 1970.15
The long and short of it is this: Working for pay now occupies
more of the time of more of our populace than ever. The job has
become a central part of most adults' lives and being employed (by
one or more employers) is the way people spend the major share of
their waking hours. Consequently, anyone with serious concerns
about the kind of people we are making ourselves to be over the long
run, and whether we can sustain the sorts of habits necessary to the
well-being of a democracy, must pay close and critical attention to
employment and the way that relationship is ordered. Briefly stated,
the employment order involves far more than simply wage rates,
power relationships, productivity, quality, or workplace voice. It quite
literally involves the constitution of human beings.
Any extended discussion of collective bargaining is out of place
here. Nevertheless, since it is the system that we are considering re-
forming, a few remarks about its distinct character are warranted. The
term collective bargaining virtually is synonymous with the Wagner
Act.16 The core goal of that statute is the protection and enhance-
ment of individuals' status through the defense and maintenance of
freely-formed employee groups. This feature defines the statute and
the unique position that the Wagner Act holds in American law. It
represents the only place in our otherwise highly individualistically-
oriented jurisprudence where the law has encouraged the formation of
mediating groups that foster individual empowerment and promote
self-determination.
It may be old news to observe that collective bargaining can pro-
vide an unmatched opportunity to involve people in making and ad-
ministering the law that most directly determines the details of their
daily fives. It may be slightly more novel, or at least more important,
to point out that in contemporary society, work has become a-and
perhaps for many the-primary source of common life for adults. As
Durkheim understood, work creates a moral environment, and its in-
fluence extends to nearly every sphere of life.17 Similarly, work is the
15. JULIET B. SCHOR, THE OVERWORKED AMERICAN: THE UNEXPECTED DECLINE OF LEI-
SURE 17-41 (1991).
16. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1988).
17. See EMILE DURKHEIM, SUICIDE 378-84 (George Simpson ed., John A. Spaulding &
George Simpson trans., The Free Press 1966) (1897).
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chief-and again for many the only-place outside the family where
people are engaged in a common undertaking.
These points highlight one of the key aspects of collective bar-
gaining. Unions are autonomous bodies. They stand independently
both of the state as well as the organizations that employ their mem-
bers. They come into being as a result of employee self-organization,
and their well-being depends on the ability of the members to main-
tain solidarity. Winner-takes-all attitudes don't produce enduring re-
lationships or democracies. Healthy and well-functioning employee
associations can provide a place where people learn to lose a point
without resentment, prevail on an argument without triumphalism,
and most importantly of all, practice the art of reasonable
compromise.
As things now stand, the town meeting, the neighborhood ward,
grassroots political organizations, and many of the other places where
these sorts of skills might be learned and practiced are withering or
absent altogether. Given the degree to which people now are tied to
the market, employee associations would seem to be the natural thing
to stand in the place of these other institutions. The fact that unions
themselves virtually have disappeared turns us to consider briefly why
this is so.
II. UNIONS AND THE VANISHING MIDDLE 18
Accounting for the decline in union membership has become
something of a cottage industry for academics during the past several
years. Theories abound, some of them most ably and intelligently dis-
cussed in the other articles in this Symposium. Prominent explana-
tions that have been put forward during the past decade include
structural changes in the economy; peculiar characteristics of Ameri-
can labor law, combined with its weak or unsympathetic enforcement;
and stiff but sophisticated employer opposition to worker self-organi-
zation. Added to these is the undoubted fact that incidents of corrup-
tion, mob influence, and wrongdoing of various sorts by union officials
have had a marked and lasting impact on our attitudes toward unions.
All of the reasons offered to explain union decline have some
force. But none of them, either singly or in combination, adequately
account for the long and steady decline in union membership that has
18. The discussion in this section draws from a portion of a forthcoming piece by the author.
For a fuller account, see Thomas C. Kohler, Civic Virtue at Work: Unions as Seedbeds of the Civic
Virtues, in SEEDBEDS OF VIRTUE: SOURCES OF COMPETENCE, CHARACTER AND CITIZENSHIP IN
AMERICAN SocITY (Mary Ann Glendon & David Blankenhorn eds.) (forthcoming 1994).
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occurred in the United States since the late 1950s. They don't because
once again, we have overlooked the significance of the middle. Schol-
ars and commentators seem invariably to neglect the point. Yet the
plain fact of the matter is that unions went into decline in the United
States at roughly the same time that all other sorts of mediating insti-
tutions began to unravel, 19 and for strikingly similar reasons. As
Americans, we are deeply and increasingly ambivalent toward associa-
tion in almost any form. The decline of unions is but part of a much
larger story.
Once again, any lengthy discussion of that story exceeds the lim-
ited bounds of a commentary. A brief comparison of union decline
with the steady withering of mainline religious denominations may
help to illuminate my point.20 As has been frequently observed,
Americans are among the most religious people on Earth. Over nine
in ten Americans claim they believe in the existence of God,21 and a
huge proportion states that religion is "very important" (fifty-four
percent) or "fairly important" (thirty-two percent) in their lives.
22
Likewise, about six in ten Americans "believe that religion can answer
all or most of today's problems." 23 Despite this, George Gallup and
Jim Castelli report that "while Americans attach great importance to
religion, they do not equate religion with church membership or at-
tendance. '24 Gallup and Castelli also found that a vast majority of
Americans believe that one can be a good Christian or Jew without
being part of a religious congregation. 25
These figures take on great interest for our purposes when they
are compared with American attitudes toward unions. As Seymour
Martin Lipset points out, extensive survey data repeatedly show that
"the majority of Americans believe that unions are essential and do
19. For example, the long and steady increase in divorce rates that we experienced in the
United States during the past two decades began around 1958-roughly the same year that the
unbroken trend of decline in U.S. union density commenced. See Theodore N. Greenstein, Mar-
ital Disruption and the Employment of Married Women, 52 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 657, 658 (1990)
(table collecting data); Robert J. LaLonde & Bernard D. Meltzer, Hard Times for Unions: An-
other Look at the Significance of Employer Illegalities, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 953, 953 n.1 (1991)
(discussing data).
20. The decline experienced by these religious congregations began around 1963, just a few
years after the steady fall in union membership rates commenced. On this decline, see BENTON
JOHNSON ET AL., VANISHING BOUNDARIES: THE RELIGION OF MAINLINE PROTESTANT BABY
BOOMERS (1994).
21. ANDREW M. GREELEY, RELIGIOUS CHANGE IN AMERICA 13-14 (1989).
22. GEORGE GALLUP, JR. & JIM CASTELLI, THE PEOPLE'S RELIGION: AMERICAN FArrIH IN
THE 90's, at 35 (1989).
23. Id. at 39.
24. Id. at 45.
25. Id. at 252.
1993]
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more good than harm, [and] that without unions employers would
maltreat workers. ' 26 Most Americans-six in ten in the most recent
pol127-also indicate that they "approve" of unions and an over-
whelming proportion of the population believes that "workers should
have the right to join unions."28 Despite all this, only about three in
ten workforce participants indicated that they would join a union if
given the opportunity.2
9
Briefly stated, notions of self-sovereignty and misgivings about
reliance on a mediator of whatever character are pervasive. For ex-
ample, ninety percent of Americans say that they pray.30 Neverthe-
less, Americans also state that they rely on themselves "rather than an
outside power such as God," to resolve life's problems.31 Similarly,
while a substantial majority of Americans approve of the functions
unions perform in society and think unions are necessary to protect
employees and to give them a voice in the workplace, nearly the same
proportion believe that they don't need a union to get fair treat-
ment.32 In short, we think unions, churches, and the other mediating
institutions that compose civil society are great-but, for somebody
else.
33
We should not be surprised that union decline has occurred at the
same time that families, churches, fraternal and service groups, local
political clubs, and similar mediating institutions began to deteriorate.
No single mediating structure of whatever description is likely to sur-
vive in the absence of others. All require and can ingrain the same
sorts of habits: decision, commitment, self-rule, and direct responsi-
bility. No single institution alone can inculcate or restore these habits.
The existence and decline of all these bodies is mutually conditioning.
The collapse or deformation of any one of them threatens the rest.
Indeed, it seems likely that the correlation between the decline of
unions and religious congregations is stronger than it may first appear.
For example, Catholics and Jews traditionally have been thought to be
26. Seymour Martin Lipset, Labor Unions in the Public Mind, in UNIONS IN TRANSITON:
ENTERING THE SECOND CENTURY 299 (Seymour Martin Lipset ed., 1986).
27. Gallup Org., August 3, 1991 (telephone poll conducted July 18-21, 1991 of 1002 respon-
dents) (poll data on file with the author).
28. James L. Medoff, Study for the AFL-CIO on Public's Image of Unions, DAILY LAB.
REP. (BNA), Dec. 24, 1984, at D-2.
29. Id.
30. GALLUP & CASTELLI, supra note 22, at 45.
31. Id. at 69-71.
32. Lipset, supra note 26, at 302-03.
33. Perhaps it is not surprising that Gallup and Castelli also report that "Americans are, in
fact, the loneliest people in the world" and that "four in ten Americans admit to frequent or
occasional feelings of intense loneliness." GALLUP & CASTELLI, supra note 22, at 253.
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more hospitable to union organization than other portions of the pop-
ulace, and persons from Catholic or Jewish backgrounds still tend to
be predominant in union leadership positions. There undoubtedly are
a great many reasons for this, one of the most obvious being that as
members of immigrant groups, many Catholics and Jews had strong
financial incentives to become active in and to support unions.
But, I think there is more involved in all this than simple eco-
nomic interest alone. For instance, Southern workers have had similar
financial reasons to join unions, yet they traditionally have been resis-
tant to organization.3 4 To condense a lot into a sparse description:
Habits of thought related to these two religious traditions may have
had rather a lot to do with the general willingness of Catholics and
Jews to become involved in or to support unions. Both traditions, for
instance, place an enormous emphasis on community. Similarly,
neither would tend to understand community-at least in its most
profound forms-simply in terms of a voluntary association of like-
minded individuals.3 5 Accordingly, neither tradition emphasizes the
supremacy of individual conscience over the norms authoritatively
transmitted through the community. As Tocqueville observes, "Ca-
tholicism may dispose the faithful to obedience, but it does not pre-
pare them for inequality." In contrast, however, "Protestantism in
general orients men much less toward equality than toward
independence." 36
One can add to this the fact that since the issuance of the first
"social encyclical" in 1891, 37 the Catholic Church officially and contin-
uously both has sanctioned and encouraged the formation of unions.38
34. This may also in some way be reflective of long-standing habits. For example, writing in
1835, Tocqueville observes that the habits of direct self-rule that characterize New England
town-government were not so frequently found in the South. See, e.g., TOCQUEVILLE, supra
note 1, at 33-35, 80-82.
35. Such views are characteristic of the modern liberal conception of association, which also
portrays all forms of association as being instrumental. See Thomas C. Kohler, Setting the Condi-
tions for Self-Rule: Unions, Associations, Our First Amendment Discourse and the Problem of
DeBartolo, 1990 Wis. L. REV. 149, 182-86. They also tend to be far more typical of the Protes-
tant conception of religious community, which also tends to conventionalize all forms of
association.
36. TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 1, at 288.
37. POPE LEO XIII, RERUM NOVARUM ON THE CONDmON OF LABOR (1939). Support for
unions among bishops and others involved in developing the foundation of Catholic social
thought was longstanding, particularly among the Germans and Americans. For a concise dis-
cussion of the development of RERUM NOVARUM see William Murphy, In the Beginning, in
BUILDING THE FREE SOCIETY: DEMOCRACY, CAPITALISM AND CATHOLIC SOCIAL TEACHING
(George Weigel & Robert Royal eds., 1993). See also PAUL MISNER, SOCIAL CATHOLICISM IN
EUROPE (1991).




In short, whether they themselves were in any sense "religious," un-
ions and the sorts of habits they require to sustain themselves may
have been particularly intelligible to persons of Jewish or Catholic
backgrounds. As both groups have become more assimilated, so has
the special intelligibility of unions (and other mediating bodies)
faded. 3
9
The accuracy of this thesis notwithstanding, it seems likely that
for the foreseeable future, we can expect a continued decline in medi-
ating groups generally. As a nation, we fast are losing the habit of
participating in organizations that require more than dropping a check
in the mail. Moreover, we increasingly no longer see the need for or
the significance of these mediating bodies. What we characteristically
do and the sorts of things we are open to understanding-indeed the
very sorts of questions that are likely to occur to us-go hand-in-hand.
Since we increasingly don't participate in them, mediating bodies have
lost their meaning for us. We won't make a commitment to what we
don't understand. And increasingly, we don't understand what things
like unions, churches, Lions' Clubs, or the Lower West Side Demo-
cratic Club have to do with anything.
Of course, the problem is that we cannot sustain a healthy de-
mocracy or polity without these bodies. So, the question is how we
can intelligently and effectively work toward setting the conditions for
their restoration. I do not mean to suggest that if unions were some-
how magically restored, everything else would follow. Moreover,
whatever form they take, autonomous employee associations will have
to take on different, or at least additional, forms and function in some-
what different ways than they have during the past fifty years.4°
39. One can speculate that the labor and the civil rights movements have had rather similar
experiences in this regard. Of course, the religious voice played a central role in the civil rights
movement-in this case, that voice emanated from the African-American Protestant churches.
But, as that voice has receded in its predominance and has been replaced almost entirely by our
dominant (and largely legalistic) rights discourse, so too does it seem that the movement's urgent
moral claims on the Nation's conscience has been lost in the welter of contemporary rights'
claims.
40. As noted above, the great French sociologist Emile Durkheim had significant interest in
the work-life sphere. See text accompanying note 17. He agreed with Tocqueville's emphasis on
the importance of mediating bodies, but he believed that the traditional mediating structures of
town, religious congregation, and family were doomed to decline in modem conditions. He saw
"occupational associations" (corporate groups of persons exercizing the same trade or occupa-
tion) as their replacement. What he did not realize was how unstable both the employment
relationship and life-long devotion to a trade or occupation would become. (Witness the con-
stant recitation of the need of the workplace for perpetual "retraining.")
Of course, along with the decline of the middle has come a significant loosening in the
employment bond itself. Contingent employment arrangements are on the rise, as is the ten-
dency of people to have two or more jobs. In these conditions, employee associations may take
[Vol. 69:229
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What is clear is that any sort of responsible labor law reform will
have to take into account the centrality of employment, its function in
inculcating habits, and its role in creating a moral environment. In
short, responsible reform will have to take the middle into account,
and the intrinsic interdependence of mediating groups upon one an-
other. The costs of overlooking the role and contributions of autono-
mous employee associations to grounding the conditions for authentic
self-rule are simply too high.41
III. ALTERNATIVES TO AUTONOMY: NEW FORMS OF
REPRESENTATION
We must live in the world as it is. And as it is, unions currently
constitute a fading presence on the American scene. What sort of
promise do alternative forms of worker representation hold for us?
What can we do for the unorganized? Once again, these are large
topics to which I can devote but a few words.
Perhaps we first should consider some of the central features of
the scheme we may be reforming. Contrary to others, I see little in
the essence of the Wagner Act that is tied to, or a direct result of, the
patterns of economic organization of the nation in the mid-1930s. It is
true enough that unions historically represent a response to changes in
social organization that occurred through the rise of liberal econo-
mies. And, it is also true that the patterns of union organization and
bargaining reflect the shape of industrial arrangements.
Nevertheless, little about these patterns is compelled by the stat-
ute or important to the Wagner Act's central scheme. To boil a lot
down to a few words: In enacting the Wagner Act, and in sharp con-
trast to the course taken by the rest of the industrialized world, Con-
gress deliberately opted for a law-making system that would involve
minimal state intervention in the employment relationship. The Act
stands as an example of what Gunther Tuebner calls a "reflexive"
legal scheme.42 In this sort of regime, the state establishes and sanc-
tions a voluntary ordering system, but leaves the outcomes achieved
through the process to be determined by the parties themselves, free
of state influence. The goal of reflexive law, Tuebner suggests is "reg-
on more of the characteristics of a "hiring hall" than have been typical of "industrial" unions, as
well as undertaking other, less-directly job related activities.
41. For a further elucidation of these points, see also Kohler, supra note 35, at 180-86, 200-
11. Of great value is Xavier Blanc-Jouvan's incisive piece Individualisme et "communautarisme"
en droit franfais: le cas des relations de travail, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REV. 693.
42. Gunther Teubner, Substantive and Reflexive Elements in Modern Law, 17 LAW & Soc'Y
REV. 239, 254-55 (1983).
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ulated autonomy," or structured self-regulation. 43 As such, reflexive
schemes represent a sharp departure from statist ordering regimes.
The Act also represents an attempt to apply the principle of sub-
sidiarity.44 Simply put, subsidiarity is an organizational norm. It rec-
ommends that institutions of all sorts be ordered so that decision
making can occur at the lowest capable level. The principle rests on
the idea that the state and all other forms of association exist for the
individual. Thus, organized bodies should not take up what individu-
als can do, nor should larger groups assume what smaller associations
can accomplish. Conversely, the state and other large institutions
have the positive responsibility to undertake those activities that
neither individuals nor smaller associations are capable of performing.
In this perspective, associations and social relationships exist to supply
help (subsidium) to individuals in assuming self-responsibility. Hence,
the subsidiary function of associations of any sort consists not in dis-
placing but in setting the conditions for authentic self-rule. A key fea-
ture of the subsidiarity principle rests in its emphasis on the middle,
i.e., the fostering of autonomous mediating groups in which civil soci-
ety exists and through which individual self-realization can occur. Not
incidentally, the principle's development has stressed the importance
of work, beginning with the inherent dignity of the human who per-
forms it, as well as the social function of autonomous employee
associations.
In brief, the Act sought to establish a private ordering system for
developing and administering the law that governs one of the most
important of relationships in modern times: employment. This was a
far bolder move than it may first appear to us, the inhabitants of the
modern regulatory state. It must be remembered that there was rela-
tively little employment law in the United States in 1935. In the sixty
or so years preceding passage of the Act, the ordering of the relation-
ship had been increasingly left to the market. Other industrialized
states had responded to the call for the reformation of this sort of
system by legal regimes that involved rather heavy state intrusion into
and regulation of the employment relationship. As noted, we went in
precisely the opposite direction. The Wagner Act held out the prom-
ise of a highly flexible scheme that would permit the parties directly
affected to come up with an order appropriate to their circumstances.
To paraphrase the late, great Harry Shulman, this was a system that
43. Id.
44. On subsidiarity, see Thomas C. Kohler, Lessons from the Social Charter: State, Corpora-
tion, and the Meaning of Subsidiarity, 43 U. TORoNTo L.J. 607 (1993), and sources cited therein.
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was intended to keep the state out, and ("mind you") to keep the
lawyers' role in it properly understood.4 5 That properly apprehended
role for lawyers would be as counselors and problem-solvers, not as
litigators and appellate advocates. Ultimate responsibility was to rest
with reasonable and responsible actors at the ground level, not with
agents of the state.
46
In sum, the Act's central scheme avoids what Max Weber called
the "iron cage" 47 in which we imprison ourselves when we see bureau-
cracies or the market as the sole available ordering solutions. It
should come as no surprise that the piecemeal and ad hoc regulation
of the employment relationship has grown markedly in direct correla-
tion with the decline of the practice of private ordering through collec-
tive bargaining. The past seventy-five years, and particularly the past
twenty, have taught us a clear lesson concerning employment: If or-
dering does not occur through the organs of civil society, it will occur
through the state-whose guarantees may be more formal than effec-
tive, and whose methods will be far less supple and adaptive than pri-
vately arrived at solutions.
Our experience with the development of common law wrongful
termination doctrines is illustrative in this regard. A recent study con-
ducted by the Rand Corporation shows that as a result of a jury trial
of a wrongful discharge claim in California, "the majority of employ-
ees can expect a payment that, in present value dollars, is the
equivalent of a half year of work."'48 The same study found that be-
cause of the high transaction costs associated with a trial, "95 percent
of all cases settle for an average of about $25,000."49
These findings are eerily reminiscent of the common law order
that obtained generally in England and in some American jurisdic-
tions through the middle part of the Nineteenth Century. Broadly
speaking, in this regime, an employer could discharge an employee
only upon proper notice, save in those cases where good cause existed
45. Harry Shulman, Reason, Contract, and Law in Labor Relations, 68 HARV. L. REV. 999,
1024 (1955).
46. It only seems fair to point out here that the source of much of the rigidity and perceived
inflexibility in the Act rests not in its own terms, but in the judicial accretions with which it has
been loaded over the years.
47. MAX WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM 181 (Talcott
Parsons trans., 1930).
48. JAMES N. DERToUzos & LYNN A. KAROLY, INST. FOR Civ. JUST., LABOR-MARKET
RESPONSES To EMPLOYER LIABILITY 36 (1992).
49. Id. The authors also found that fear of liability on the part of employers may have led




for not giving such notice. The amount of notice required turned on
the character of the plaintiff's position, e.g., one month's notice for
household help, up to six months for more highly compensated em-
ployees.50 The reported cases from this period appear not to inquire
into the question of cause, but instead deal with the nature of the
plaintiff's job and whether the parties intended for their relationship
to be on terms other than those established by the general rules. The
remedy for discharge in the absence of proper notice was the income
the plaintiff would have received had that person worked through the
end of the notice period.
Because they turn on the question of the existence of good cause,
modern trials over wrongful discharge may be more involved, more
expensive, and more intrusive upon the employer-employee relation-
ship than their Nineteenth Century predecessors. Taken as a whole,
however, (and assuming that California is any guide) the modern doc-
trines seem to have developed a sort of de facto common law rule that
permits plaintiffs roughly half a year's pay in cases where some ques-
tion exists about whether they were discharged with just cause. Given
the costs and uncertainties associated with litigation, and the results
that litigation on average produces for plaintiffs, perhaps we eventu-
ally will see a statutory regime that would require that persons to be
discharged receive notice of some stated period (e.g. six months), and
in its absence, "severence pay" in the amount of a half year's salary, or
some combination of the two, save in a presumably narrow band of
cases (which would be statutorily defined) where "good cause" exists
to give neither. I am not urging the desirability of such a scheme.
But, I think it does typify the sorts of limited results one can expect
from reliance upon a public ordering regime. And indeed, it is just the
sort of regime that exists in jurisdictions that do not rely upon collec-
tive bargaining systems.
In sharp contrast to bureaucratically oriented regimes, the whole
scheme of the Act revolves around the formation and maintenance of
autonomous employee associations. Thus, the Act's section 8(a)(2)
was intended to do far more than settle a long-standing squabble
about how employees might achieve voice in managerial decision
making. 51 It would also serve to anchor what was supposed to be a
50. See, e.g., Bleeker v. Johnson, 51 How. Pr. 380 (1876); Fawcett v. Cash, 110 Eng. Rep.
1026 (1834).
51. On section 8(a)(2) see Thomas C. Kohler, Models of Worker Participation: The Uncer-
tain Significance of Section 8(a)(2), 27 B.C. L. REV. 499 (1986).
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comprehensive system for ordering all aspects of the employment
relationship.
Section 8(a)(2) had some other, undoubtedly unintended but nev-
ertheless important, benefits as well. One of the most notable and far
reaching benefits is this: Given the importance of the work-life sphere
in contemporary culture, the promotion of employee self-organization
could serve as a buffer against the sort of fragmentation of the polity
that Tocqueville understood would deform and pervert a democracy.
This fragmentation results when people lose the ability to settle on
and engage in undertaking a common purpose.
The rise of this sort of fragmentation is as insidious as it is perni-
cious. As the circles within which they act shrink, people literally lose
touch with one another, and thereby the commonality of understand-
ings, sentiments, judgments, and goals that sustain willing cooperation
and a healthy polity dissipate. The idea of some common good is re-
placed by factional interest, and worse, a sense of individual helpless-
ness vis-a-vis the state or the large institutions of the market. With the
habits of self-action weak or in desuetude, and the sentiments neces-
sary to sustain commonality lax, people drift into a state of atomistic
isolation and effective dependency on the state or other large institu-
tions. Common action comes to appear at best a romantic yearning
"for a simpler era" and self-government another way of saying every
man or women for him or herself. Interest groups narrowly described
replace the middle, and increasingly, only the institutions of market or
state are seen as credible.
Whatever else they may do, alternative forms of "worker repre-
sentation" will not truly take the place of those anchored by and de-
veloped through free-standing employee associations. The
alternatives will (or, do) not represent the product of self-organiza-
tional activity. They are not autonomous. As such, they do not con-
stitute a part of the crucial middle that I have been describing.
Nor, of course, are the alternatives intended to perform the same
functions as the autonomous employee association. As George
Strauss and Eliezer Rosenstein pointed out nearly twenty-five years
ago,52 participative management theory springs from entirely differ-
ent sources and assumptions, and is intended to serve a rather differ-
ent and far more restricted set of goals, than is the so-called collective
bargaining model. 53 Briefly stated, those goals are organizational ef-
52. George Strauss & Eliezer Rosenstein, Workers Participation: A Critical View, 9 INDUS.
REL. 197 (1969).
53. On these points, see Kohler, supra note 51, at 513-18.
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fectiveness (as bureaucratically defined), not private ordering or em-
ployee self-determination.
These differences raise many issues. One of them is this: Do par-
ticipative schemes unanchored by an autonomous employee associa-
tion promise more than they deliver? There is much reason to believe
that this is the case. As is frequently pointed out, "participation" is a
managerial ethic. The ethic rests on the creation of an atmosphere of
trust between the parties that will set the grounds for the willing and
intelligent cooperation 54 by employees with organizational goals,
which ultimately are established and controlled by management.
A relationship of trust implies a selflessness among the parties,
for the one trusted must be constantly willing to put the others' good
before his or her own. In short, trust involves a sort of self-transcen-
dence and, as Aristotle observes, it is a hallmark of the most authentic
sort of friendship.55 Succinctly stated, participative management theo-
ries make self-transcendence easy. For they rest on the idea that there
are no inherent conflicts of interest among people in work organiza-
tions that demand structural accommodation. Thus, pace Adam
Smith,56 the interests of employer and employed are identical. Trust
as selflessness thus involves no real moral or intellectual conversion in
the sense suggested by traditional religious thought or classical polit-
ical philosophy. People, including those with ultimate decisional au-
thority, simply will act in a trustworthy (i.e., selfless) manner once
they understand that they should. In other words, being "good" is a
matter of education, because people will do the "right" thing once
they know what it is. To use ttienne Gilson's description, such ideas
represent a species of "angelism." But, of course, as James Madison
points out,57 men are not angels, and hence attention must be paid to
structures that can accommodate conflicting interests and to limit the
libido dominandi that is so much a part of all of us. It comes as no
surprise that participative schemes like TQM (Total Quality Manage-
ment) are spoken of by their proponents as a new religion. But, like
the new religion proclaimed by the boy prophet in Flannery
54. For a brief description of the conditions necessary to sustain cooperation, see Kohler,
supra note 44. On the underlying cooperationist scheme of the Wagner Act, see the thoughtful
piece by Mark Barenberg, The Political Economy of the Wagner Act: Power, Symbol, and Work-
place Cooperation, 106 HARV. L. REv. 1379 (1993).
55. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHics 207-66 (Terence Irwin trans., 1985) (Books 8, 9).
He goes on to observe that people should count themselves lucky if they have two or three real
friends during the course of their lifetime. E.g., id. at 263 (Book 9, 1171a20).
56. E.g., ADAM SMTH, Ti WEALTH OF NATrIONS chs. 6, 8 (1776).
57. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 322 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
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O'Connor's Wise Blood58-the Church of Christ without Christ-it
seems to be missing something.
Participative management theories have another deeply troubling
aspect as well. Corporate bodies of whatever description, whether
they be business organizations, political communities, voluntary
groups, etc., all face a common issue: How we can be both one and
many, or to put the matter just slightly differently, how each person
can be a distinct and unique individual, yet be related to and operate
cocperatvely with other distinct and unique individuais. Participative
management techniques attempt to resolve this problem by seeking to
create a state of complete identity between the individual and the
group. In other words, they reify the group as the sole individual.
They do this by seeking to replace individual attitude and conscience
with a group conscience, which in turn is given its shape and orienta-
tion by corporate leadership. In short, this is why participative theory
techniques represent a bureaucratic adjunct. They are intended to
achieve a mass that will act efficiently and as one. To use Tatsuo In-
oue's term, such schemes can produce a form of "companyism" that
may deny individual status altogether.5 9 In the theoretical perspective
from which these schemes tend to proceed, individuals exist only in
and through the group; they have no separate character outside it.
I do not mean to suggest that there is nothing whatever of value
to participative management schemes. That is plainly not the case.
As a managerial ethic, participative schemes can enhance the scope of
the individual workers to make workplace decisions vis-a-vis other
style of managing. By increasing the organization's reliance upon the
good sense of the man or woman on the spot best to figure out how to
accomplish a task, such schemes also are intelligent.60 But, given the
foregoing, perhaps it is no surprise that the data show that participa-
tion plans function best, and have the best chance for survival, when
they are anchored by an autonomous employee association.61 Our do-
58. FLANNERY O'CONNOR, Wise Blood, in FLANNERY O'CONNOR: COLLECTED WORKS
(Library of America 1988).
59. Tatsuo Inoue, The Poverty of Rights-Blind Communality: Looking Through the Window
at Japan, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REv. 517, 530. On the term "companyism," see id. at 528-30. See also
Kohler, supra notes 6, 44.
60. Maryellen Kelley and Bennett Harrison have found that the introduction of participa-
tion schemes in "U.S. manufacturing workplaces has mainly been part of an effort by managers
in large bureaucracies to overcome the rigidities associated with this organizational form."
Maryellen R. Kelley & Bennett Harrison, Unions, Technology, and Labor-Management Cooper-
ation, in UNIONS AND ECONOMIC COMPETITIVENESS 247,263 (Lawrence Mishel & Paula B. Voos
eds., 1992).
61. E.g., id. There is nothing fundamental to the scheme of collective bargaining that re-
quires its narrow focus simply on wage rates and benefits. Indeed, the basic scheme of the Act is
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mestic experience is confirmed by the experience of other nations,
which shows that devices like works councils only function well, and
achieve significant results for employees, when they exist in an organ-
ized context.
62
Like the original debate over its terms, much of the current dis-
cussion over labor law reform is concentrated upon the provisions of
section 8(a)(2). Certainly, a lot has changed during the nearly sixty
years that have intervened since the Act's passage. The one thing that
remains constant, however, is human character. In revisiting these
provisions, we revisit an ideological debate that had been fully re-
hearsed before Congress. By striking off in an entirely different direc-
tion, we will be attempting to do something that no one else in the
world has been able to achieve: make participative devices function
without some form of autonomous employee body to ground them.
We will be doing more as well. We will be giving public sanction to
yet another turn away from one of the institutions that grounds the
middle. It may be more prudent to inquire in the other direction and
to ask what sorts of steps we can take to sustain and restore these
crucial institutions, including autonomous employee bodies. Problems
rarely are solved by furthering the types of actions that brought the
problem on in the first place.
CONCLUSION
Wholes cohere about a middle. But, even as they described the
crucial role mediating institutions play in a liberal democratic order,
the farseeing amongst us continually have warned about the destruc-
tive pressures that the institutions constituting the middle would face.
At first glance, these sorts of issues would seem far removed from
labor law and the employment order. The more one looks into the
matter, however, the more clear it becomes how deeply interrelated
the problems of the middle are with the seemingly mundane world of
work. Indeed, the whole question of labor law reform presently con-
fronts us because of the general decline in mediating institutions, in-
cluding unions, and the increasing laxness in our habits of association.
consistent with broad-based cooperation. The main contribution of participative schemes to or-
ganized settings may rest simply in reawakeining our imaginations as to the great flexibility in-
herent in the collective bargaining model.
62. See, e.g., International Colloquium on Labor Law: Models of Employee Representa-
tional Participation, 15 COMP. LAB. L.J. 1 (1993), and particularly the papers by Marie Mercat
Bruns, Worker Representation at 1, and Rudolf Buschmann, Workers Participation at the Enter-
prise Level in France, at 15 and Rudolf Buschmann, Workers Participation and Collective Bar-
gaining in Germany, at 26.
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Succinctly stated, our ability to "compete" is not a mere matter of
technology, of selecting and properly employing the right manage-
ment techniques. Maintaining a liberal political and economic order is
truly hard work. It requires that people possess a certain sort of disci-
pline. However inconvenient, the plain fact remains that there is no
replacement for individual goodness, intelligence, reasonableness, and
responsibility. But, these characteristics are virtues. A virtue is an
operative habit, and habits require inculcation and practice. In short,
the health and competitiveness of our polity and our economy depend
on the existence of functioning schemes that can regularly and recur-
rently assist people in obtaining the sorts of habits on which a liberal
order depends. We must never forget that we do not just trade in
time, but we constantly are trading across time as well. What we have
is not solely our creation, and the effects of the order we are establish-
ing will be felt less by us than by those who come after us.
Labor law reform confronts us with some enormously difficult
and complex problems. It is tempting to ignore them, but pretending
they aren't there won't make them go away. Looking past our diffi-
culties only makes them more acute. If we are to deal with these
problems in an effective and responsible way, however, we must go
beyond our well-worn, comfortable because familiar, but all-too-nar-
row analytical boundaries and habits of thought. The employment or-
der involves much more than we typically think.
As we consider the shape labor law reform might take, one more
thing must be kept in mind: Institutional orders inconsistent with our
character as humans will not survive. Consequently, the most pressing
question we face is whether and to what degree our notions of our-
selves as human actors is accurate. Everything turns on the answers to
this query. Bluntly stated, try as we might, in the final analysis, we
can't get past ourselves. We're simply too big to ignore.
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